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Abstract: This paper discusses the proposals to limit the size of the banks, also known as tackling 
the banks’ incentives to become “too big to fail”. I examine how regulations to curb bank size may 
affect banks’ operating costs. I analyze the relationship between the size of U.S. bank holding 
companies (BHCs) and their operating costs from 2001:Q2 to 2014:Q1. I find that rules to limit the 
size of banks could significantly reduce economies of scale. In particular, if large and cost-efficient 
banks become split into smaller parts, data processing, legal fees, audit and consulting expenses, 
expenses on premises are likely to increase. 
The second part of the paper deals with the phenomenon known as “too big to jail” and examines 
banks’ settlements. I compile a novel dataset on 341 litigation charges and settlements and find evidence 
that larger banks and banks with a higher credit risk, but not necessarily more systemically risky 
banks, face litigation charges more frequently. I do however observe that penalties had little effect on 
BHCs’ profitability, and that some of the largest banks continuously faced litigation charges which 
may imply that benefits from wrongdoing outweighed the costs or that many large banks relied on 
the fact they they will be considered immune from prosecution due to their sheer size and their influence on 
the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The evolution of U.S. financial legislation reflects a long-running public debate about the appropriate size and 
scope of banking firms. As noted in Barth et al. (2012), financial institutions have been continuously growing 
in size. The assets of the top 50 companies in 2011 were roughly equal to total U.S. GDP, which represents 
about a four‐fold increase in four decades. In the fourth quarter of 2011, the combined assets of the five 
biggest companies totalled about 60 percent of U.S. GDP. By contrast, in 1970 the corresponding figure was 
only 10 percent. For the top ten companies, the figures increased from 14 percent to 75 percent.1 
The striking growth in size and importance of BHCs subsidiaries dates back almost entirely to the period after 
the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 1999, allowing the banks to engage in a broad range of financial 
activities in various states, including securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting, and 
merchant banking activities, all of which led to intensified competition in the banking industry. Banks have 
also faced increased competition in wholesale markets, due to increasingly deeper and more efficient financial 
markets (e.g., high-yield commercial debt, CP, equity finance) which have provided banks’ business 
customers with alternatives to traditional bank loans.  
Well-managed banks responded to these competitive pressures by becoming more cost efficient and more 
revenue-efficient, which aligns well with the classic economic theory that suggests that when banks grow in 
size, there might be a significant number of benefits accompanying such expansion, for example, increasing 
economies of scale and an increase in the banks’ bargaining power. This includes offering customers a wider 
range of new nontraditional fee-based products, selling increased amounts of existing fee-based products, 
pricing fee-based products more efficiently, improving the quality of fee-based products and services and 
minimizing costs by reducing the number of employees and introducing new technologies. 
There has been a secular trend in recent decades toward enlarging and contracting the allowable scope of BHC 
activities. In general, it seems that contraction in banking activities usually follows major crises, and 
expansion is favored in boom years. It is axiomatic to assert that the past couple of years after August 2007 
were not the finest or easiest to the banks. For example, since the recent financial crisis there have been 
several proposals to impose caps on bank size and limit the scope of banking activities, such as the “Volcker 
rule” provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) in 
the U.S. prohibiting BHCs from engaging in proprietary trading and limiting their investments in hedge funds, 
private equity and related vehicles. In particular, the recent financial crisis has brought forward concerns about 
                                                          
1A historic perspective on "too big to fail" is provided in Barth et al. (2012)  
banks that regulators deem “too big to fail” in the sense that their failure would pose serious systemic risks, 
which has prompted calls for regulatory limits on bank size (Reich, 2008; O’Driscoll, 2009). 
Recent petitions to break up “too-big-to fail” banks and pass new laws similar to the last century’s Glass-
Steagall Act have come in various shapes and flavors.2 For example, Johnson and Kwak (2010: 214) argue 
that “no financial institution [s]hould be allowed to control or have an ownership interest in assets worth 
more than a fixed percentage of U.S. GDP” (they propose a 4 percent ownership ratio). Others suggest various 
alternatives including levies or progressively higher capital requirements on large banking firms to encourage 
them to shed assets. Big banks oppose efforts to break them up, reasoning that their larger size makes them 
more efficient. Also, the treatment of large banks as "too big to fail" could generate scale economies by 
lowering the risk premiums demanded by creditors of large banks, thereby giving them a funding advantage 
over smaller banks. 
The assessment of the extent of scale economies is important for a full analysis of the costs and benefits of 
any policy intervention to limit the size of banks. Policymakers should consider the loss of any scale benefits 
when determining the net benefit of limiting the size of banks. Although bankers often claim that banks can 
lower costs by expanding in size, many policymakers and academics remain skeptical (e.g. Stern and 
Feldman, 2009; Greenspan, 2010; Haldane, 2010). 
A frequently mentioned rationale for splitting large banks is that larger banks can enjoy cheaper insurance 
premiums disconnected from their actual risk levels, and implicit government insurance, since government 
cannot allow huge banks to collapse. This means they can essentially gamble for resurrection and expect to be 
bailed out if things go wrong. That is, it is possible that operating costs are no lower in big banks, but simply 
that large banks benefit from implicit guarantees. However, it may be the case BHCs become more efficient as 
they grow in size and subsequently can reduce their operating costs which will have a positive effect on a 
wider society and bank fees decrease, consistent with the classic economic theory. In that case, government-
mandated size limits are likely to be a deadweight loss and constitute an unnecessary or even unfair form of 
intervention in financial markets. 
In this chapter, I focus primarily on the costs which banks control internally. Thus, as far as banks’ operating 
costs are concerned, it is true that while banks cannot generally choose what regulations to comply with, as 
these are most often exogenous, they are free to choose their operating costs. I examine questions such as 
whether banks obtain more bargaining power as they grow in size and thereby can reduce their operating 
costs, or whether some costs increase proportionally with size or perhaps some costs grow more rapidly than 
the growth of banks’ assets. There exists some empirical evidence (e.g. Kozubovska (2017)) that size is 
positively correlated with opacity, and for that reason many of the banks’ costs might rise (e.g. audit, legal 
fees, FDIC premiums) as it is more difficult to evaluate banks’ exposure to various risks. On the other hand, 
postage and IT costs can decrease, as these may constitute monthly fixed costs which when spread over a 
                                                          
2 For example, E. Warren’s calls on Congress to break up the big banks: “U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren on Wednesday 
called on lawmakers to break up big banks and change tax rules that benefit Wall Street. She said lawmakers should 
break big down and limit the U.S. Federal Reserve's ability to lend in a crisis so that big institutions cannot count on a 
bailout” (Reuters, April 15, 2015). 
larger sized entity will increase operating revenue or alternatively decrease efficiency ratios. This is important 
because banks typically pass on these costs to customers or shareholders. 
The recent financial crisis has not been solely an economic phenomenon, but a legal one as well. It has 
brought to light much of banks’ wrongdoing. A frequently mentioned but perhaps less pronounced feature of 
big banks is that for a long time they have been shielded from legal responsibility for their misconduct. As 
noted by some leading U.S. judges, some banks have become “too big to jail” (Rogoff, 2016). Term “too big 
to jail” was coined to describe the theory that certain financial institutions, even if they engage in criminal 
misconduct, should be considered immune from prosecution due to their sheer size and their influence on the 
economy. A mere look at the levels of the recent tsunami of legal settlements shows why politicians have been 
active as ever in trying to break up big banks and eliminate the incentive for banks to become simultaneously 
“too big to fail” and “too big to jail”. 3 
Litigation risk has been of paramount importance, especially after the mounting charges and litigation 
settlements related in particular to market manipulation litigation, U.S. mortgage-related issues, product mis-
selling litigation, tax evasion litigation, U.S. embargo issues, misrepresentation litigation, and company-
specific issues. The penalties for such behavior are sobering. For example, since 2009 litigation costs have 
grown four years in a row, and banks on both sides of the Atlantic have paid out a total of $178 billion in 
litigation costs; banks’ legal bills have also swelled with them (WSJ, 2014). During the first nine months of 
2014, banks in the U.S. and the E.U. paid out $60 billion to settle legal claims. That was up from $46 billion 
in 2013, $44 billion in 2012 and $22 billion in 2011, as noted in the recent research by Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) and references in FT (2015). Even though U.S. banks have settled the bulk of claims arising 
from pre-crisis mortgages, BCG predicts that potential litigation risks remain substantial. For example, as of 
2014 JPMorgan Chase said that it was involved in legal proceedings on more than 20 fronts, including 
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) into whether the bank bought car loans that had been 
priced according to the race and ethnicity of the borrower. 
The exact litigation costs vary based on data sources. For example, a British study came up with higher 
figures. According to the U.K. based CCP Research Foundation, the total post-crisis litigation cost aimed at 
the biggest global banks since 2010 hit $300 billion over a five-year rolling period (FT, 2015). Differences 
may come from various estimation techniques in quantifying losses, such as foregone profits or clients’ 
attrition, the order to keep higher capital requirements or the prohibition from involvement in some type of 
lending business; or damage to a bank’s reputation4 might constitute another form of penalty. 
Much of post-crisis litigation was mortgage related. For example, from 2010 through the end of third-quarter 
2013, together the six "too big to fail" and "too big to jail" banks paid $85.75 billion in credit and mortgage-
                                                          
3 Elaborate discussion on litigation issues are provided in ‘Litigation Handbook’ prepared by OCC, available at http:// 
www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-m-litigation-and-other-legal- 
matters.pdf. 
4 Reputational risk is the potential that negative publicity regarding an institution's business practices, whether true or 
not, will cause a decline in the customer base, incur costly litigation, or revenue reductions. (SR 95-51). For instance, the 
“reputational penalty” is estimated to be 7.5 times the total amount of penalties imposed by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission on the 585 firms subject to enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation between 1978 and 
2002, as noted in Karpoff, et al. (2008).  
related settlement costs. Bank of America paid out $43.9 billion; JPMorgan Chase paid out $26.4 billion; 
Wells Fargo paid out $9.5 billion; Citigroup paid out $4.7 billion; Goldman Sachs paid out $920 million; and 
Morgan Stanley paid out over $329 million. In addition to settlement monies, since 2008 the six banks have 
also had to repurchase ("buyback") $98.9 billion worth of bad mortgages they stuffed into collapsed 
mortgage-backed securities they sold to investors around the globe (SEC, 2015). However, these elements of 
the credit crisis and mortgage-related settlements are not the only measure of banks' misbehavior. 
Reasons for other large recent fines include e.g. the manipulation of foreign-exchange markets. Bank of 
America paid $250 million to the OCC and has also agreed to pay $180 million to settle a lawsuit by private 
investors who accused the bank and others of manipulating foreign-exchange rates. In turn, Citigroup and J.P. 
Morgan paid more than $1 billion each in fines to various regulators. Bank of America is the third bank to 
settle investor claims related to the $5.3 trillion-a-day currency market. JPMorgan Chase & Co settled for 
$99.5 million in January, and Switzerland's UBS AG settled for $135 million in March. Another example of 
fines with U.S. regulators includes HSBC which settled a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. DoJ 
for $1.9 billion after the British bank facilitated money laundering. The amount included $655 million in civil 
penalties and $1.25 billion forfeiture, approved in July 2013. This has been the largest penalty placed on a 
bank for violating Bank Secrecy Act (hereafter BSA). A majority of sources (e.g. WSJ, FT) document that the 
majority of costs originate with U.S. regulators’ legal claims; typically banks in the U.S. face much higher 
costs compared to other countries and occurrences of banks suing each other is more rare. 
So far, it has been noted that the largest banks are balancing the risk of paying penalties while generating 
significant revenue from such wrongdoing. A glance at the frequency of litigation settlements (Table 2a and 
Table 3a in Appendix 2) supports the notion that fines do not act as efficient deterrents against engaging in 
financial misconduct. Therefore, in the U.S. in particular, the regulatory authorities have increased their 
appetite to pursue litigation against banks. 
Litigation risk is of interest on its own. Litigation risk is different from other risks that banks may face. What 
distinguishes litigation risk from most other risks is that litigants lack a mechanism to dispose of litigation risk 
(Molot, 2009). Virtually any other risk that a business faces can be spread out or eliminated via the market by 
purchasing some form of insurance. Also, if a new business line is too costly or risky for a bank to pursue on 
its own, it can find a larger partner and undertake a joint venture, or it can raise capital for the project through 
public or private markets, in the form of debt or equity. When it comes to litigation risk, however, a bank that 
is sued is generally stuck with this risk. Insurance companies do not sell after-the-event insurance policies for 
lawsuits that have already been filed and there does not exist a market in which litigants can trade away 
litigation risk. Neither the legal profession, nor the insurance industry or the capital markets have yet found a 
way to relieve litigants of risk. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) said that a $4.4 billion increase in 
legal expenses for a small number of large banks was the key factor in a 7 percent drop in the banking sector's 
earnings for the fourth quarter of 2014. FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions reported 
aggregate net income of $36.9 billion in the quarter, which was down $2.9 billion from earnings of $39.8 
billion for the same quarter in 2013, mostly due to the rise in litigation costs at the large banks, according to a 
statement. 
The motivation, contribution, originality and value of my study are the following. As for the contribution, I 
examine in detail BHCs’ operating costs. Given the mixed findings of previous studies on the economies of 
scale in the banking industry, I analyze "too big to fail" BHCs in the U.S. from the perspective of the 
economies of scale from 2001:Q2 to 2014:Q1. I explore this issue using a much larger universe of banks than 
that of the existing study by the Clearing House (CH, 2011) on the banks’ economies of scale. My sample is 
around two hundred times larger than that of CH and I use publicly available data from audited regulatory 
filings, as opposed to the proprietary internal management information used by the CH. I examine the extra 
costs citizens or shareholders will have to face if banks are broken into smaller banks and whether these costs 
are passed directly to bank customers or are translated into reduced firm value for shareholders. My choice is 
motivated by the paramount interest in the recent financial press in banks’ incentive to grow in size, in 
litigation risk and in the consequences from the newly cooked regulations that will affect "too big to fail", "too 
big to jail" banks and their expenses. 
I also provide some fresh evidence on litigation charges. I compile a novel dataset on 341 litigation charges 
and settlements, which to the best of my knowledge has not been used in any previous studies. It has been a 
significant effort to collect and classify expenses and I was the first to focus on banks’ litigation expenses. 
Thus, I am not aware of any study which focuses on the characteristics of the banks and their litigation 
charges. This is surprising, given that the costs of litigation are colossal, especially once aggregated across the 
industry. More generally, my research also has implications for the literature on systemic risk. I test whether 
systemically more risky banks are also more likely to be involved in alleged financial wrongdoing.  
1.2 Related Literature 
1.2.1 Economies of scale and “too big to fail” 
Economies of scale permit larger firms to produce their products and provide their services at lower average 
costs per unit than smaller firms (Shepherd, 1979). That is, as firms produce more, they spread fixed input 
costs over a larger quantity of output, thus lowering per unit average costs. This ability to manufacture 
products and to provide services at a lower average cost should translate directly into higher profits, while also 
possibly creating significant barriers to entry into any industry in which economies of scale are present, as 
noted in Bain (1954). 
Advantages associated with increasing scale can be gained from a variety of factors (Scherer, 1980). For 
example, at the product or service level, expanding firms can invest in specialized and more efficient 
equipment, machinery, and technology, which lower per unit production costs. Firms also have incentives to 
further improve the speed and efficiency of these resources, and engage in efforts that further enhance the 
efficiency of their production processes and increase output. Increasing output also allows employees to 
specialize in their tasks and gain proficiency; as a result, increasing scale also produces experience or learning 
effects, which have been found to exist in nearly all industry settings (Wright, 1936; Asher, 1956; Shepherd, 
1979; Rosenberg, 1982). 
Overall, studies on economies of scale in the banking industry produced mixed findings. Studies have 
confirmed the existence of economies of scale and diseconomies of scale. The earliest studies of scale 
economies in the banking industry, estimated during an era when U.S. banking organizations were on average 
much smaller than today, found evidence of modest economies of scale. For example, Mitchell and Onvural 
(1996) document that increasing levels of production in large banks is usually cost efficient; but they also 
found that there is relatively little to gain by increasing the scale of production. Thus, their study provides 
additional confirmation that the minimum efficient scale can be achieved in relatively modest-sized banks and 
that the average cost curve for most banking institutions is relatively flat. In contrast, in a study of commercial 
banks and savings and loan associations, using data from the 1960s, Benston (1972) found consistent 
economies of scale, indicating that larger banks and financial institutions enjoy significant cost advantages. 
Kim (1986) found that credit unions exhibit modest economies of scale, especially in their mortgage lending 
and investment activities. In an extensive review of the literature on economies of scale in financial 
institutions published prior to 1988 Clark (1988) concludes that smaller financial firms may be at a cost 
disadvantage compared to larger, more diversified banking firms. Others, using more flexible cost functions, 
found that these scale economies were only limited to small banks (Benston et al., 1982; Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991,1992; Peristiani, 1997), which would support the idea of breaking up big banks. 
A number of studies, however, find evidence of scale economies even among the largest banking firms Feng 
and Serletis, 2010; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and Mester, 2013). These findings, in contrast to the 
previous evidence, oppose limits on the size of banks that would undercut economies of scale in banking. 
The first systematic effort to examine and quantify the benefits that large banks provide to consumers, 
companies, and governments, as well as the U.S. economy as a whole is that by the Clearing House (CH, 
2011). This study, which relies on proprietary data from a relatively low number of institutions, documents 
that large U.S. banks provide benefits for companies, consumers, and governments totaling an estimated $50 
billion to $110 billion annually. Banks larger than $500 billion provide over half of the total benefit. It is also 
noted in the CH report that large banks spur innovation and economic growth, which could not be achieved if 
big banks were broken into smaller entities. For example, as noted in CH (2011), sophisticated and costly IT 
platforms allow large banks to provide global reporting and compliance, helping investors monitor and 
analyze their positions. However, this innovation may also lead to costly future litigation. 
Smaller banks could not generate the volumes needed to make worthwhile the investment necessary to 
develop such reporting systems and global compliance expertise. Dedicated platforms and broad regulatory 
experience allow large custodians to undertake these activities much more efficiently and expertly than even 
large customers might on their own. This study estimates total annual benefits from large banks spreading 
innovation to be around $15 billion to $30 billion. CH analysis estimates that aggregate benefits from online 
bill payment, debit cards, credit cards, wire transfers, automated clearing house, check processing, and trade 
processing economies of scale associated with these seven services are $10 billion to $25 billion per year. 
This is not surprising. Many innovations require a large customer base to succeed, which is either impossible 
to achieve for small banks or will require many small banks to act together to capture the benefits of 
innovation.5 
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Furthermore, as noted in several Uniform Bank Performance Reports (hereafter UBPR),6 large banks tend to 
have lower efficiency ratios (i.e. banks are more efficient) because they generate more non-interest income 
compared to smaller banks. It is also noted that cost efficiencies are usually the underlying rationale for 
mergers and acquisitions. Costs savings in personnel expenses, occupancy expense, goodwill impairment, 
intangible amortization and other expenses are the main drivers of bank mergers and acquisitions. However, 
large banks are also perceived as having deep pockets and therefore attract greater levels of litigation7. 
In contrast to studies that find positive effects stemming from banks as they grow in size, many studies have 
concluded that expanding banks will eventually reach a point where average costs stop decreasing and start to 
increase. Benston et al. (1982) modeled a translog cost function to estimate U-shaped average cost curves, and 
their analysis found that the largest banks face significant diseconomies of scale. In a comparable study, Clark 
(1996) concluded that the average cost curve for banks is relatively flat with diseconomies of scale found only 
among the smallest and largest banks. Clark (1996) also notes that a lower efficiency ratio would generate 
higher ROA. In other words, the more efficient banks are not necessarily more profitable, because banks’ 
concentration on reducing costs may actually contribute to poor investment decisions and increased risk 
taking. 
As far as other reasons behind banks’ operating costs are concerned, it has also been frequently mentioned in 
the literature that firms are operating inside their production possibilities frontier because of agency conflicts, 
management problems, or other inefficiencies, so-called X-inefficiencies8 (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; 
Berger et al., 1993). 
Overall, from around 220 articles9 discussing large banks, 47 percent discuss the risk of large banks, 21 
percent focus on the market effects, 12 percent examine the internal efficiencies of large banks (including 
economies of scale) and the remaining 20 percent focus on the scope of products and services. As for the 
views on costs versus benefits 71 percent of the studies on risk hold a view that large banks are more risky 
with the remaining 29 percent claiming the opposite. As for the internal efficiencies, 52 percent of the studies 
find negative effects stemming from the larger size of the banks, while 48 percent find that as banks grow in 
size they are actually becoming more internally efficient. As for scope, approximately 88 percent of the 
studies analyzed find large benefits to the general economy stemming from large banks. Large banks provide 
a broad set of products and services that smaller banks cannot provide at all, or at least cannot provide in an 
equally integrated and comprehensive manner. 
In conclusion, the literature provides mixed evidence on the relationship between bank size and the various 
aspects of bank performance. Broader economic consequences of imposing caps on bank size are also not 
clear. 
                                                          
6 UBPR reports were retrieved from http://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm on June 6, 2015. 
7 Author is grateful to Prof. Simon Wolfe for raising this comment. 
8 The concept of X-inefficiency was introduced by Harvey Leibenstein (1966). 
9 These 220 academic articles are relevant articles from the past three years published in a selection of top economics and 
finance journals and articles cited in FSOC report and the Independent Commission on Banking: Vickers Report (2011). 
1.2.2 Litigation overview 
There is a relative scarcity of economic studies on litigation settlements in the banking industry. The majority 
of existing literature focuses on market reaction to the announcement of the litigation charges, providing 
mixed findings. Another strand of the literature focuses on corporate governance of the banks that have faced 
litigation charges (e.g. board independence or the characteristics of CEOs of those banks). The lack of studies 
is primarily because data on litigation settlements have been confidential for a relatively long time. In what 
follows, I present an overview on bank enforcement actions and several facts from recent industry 
publications and the financial press. 
Enforcement actions can take one of two forms: (1) informal understandings between banks and their 
supervisors; (2) more formal actions, which are enforceable in the courts. Prior to 1989, however, the public 
never learned about the vast majority of enforcement actions, with which supervisors used to bring banks into 
compliance with consumer regulations and safety and soundness standards. In 1989, despite objections from 
various supervisory agencies in the US, Congress mandated disclosure of the most serious formal actions, 
cease-and-desist orders. Soon after, the Congress expanded disclosure requirements, directing that the public 
be notified about all formal enforcement actions. 
For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC) did require depository institutions, 
with publicly traded stock, to disclose enforcement actions deemed “material.” In addition, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (hereafter OCC)—on a limited, case-by-case basis—disclosed the facts 
surrounding its enforcement actions (Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation’s Financial 
Institutions (OCC, 1989). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA) and the Crime Control Act of 1990 required supervisory agencies for the first time to publicly 
disclose final, formal enforcement actions as well as any modifications or terminations of the actions (Gilbert 
and Vaughan, 2001). In the debate over FIRREA, the House of Representatives questioned the secrecy about 
enforcement actions, noting that bank supervisors were alone among federal regulators in keeping civil 
enforcement actions confidential (FIRREA 1989: 470). The House also asserted that confidentiality served 
only to perpetuate banker misconduct and exacerbate the problems of troubled institutions. Disclosure, in 
contrast, would inform taxpayers about the effectiveness of the bank regulatory system, warn depository 
institutions about the types of conduct that would not be tolerated and the financial community about 
particular problem banks (OCC, 1989).10 It is also supposed to strengthen market discipline because an 
announcement that a supervisor had imposed a formal action warns depositors that serious regulatory 
compliance or safety and soundness issues exist in the affected institution. That is, from 1990 onwards 
supervisors have begun to announce publicly the imposition of formal enforcement actions. 
The changes in 1990 in publicly announcing enforcement actions provides a quasi-experimental setting to test 
whether putting confidential supervisory information in the public domain will spark bank runs or whether it 
will enhance depositor discipline. Gilbert and Vaughan (2001) measure depositor reaction to 87 Federal 
                                                          
10 A concise summary of financial firms’ litigation matters is available at 
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-m-litigation-and-other-legal-
matters.pdf. 
Reserve announcements of enforcement actions. They compare deposit growth rates and yield spreads before 
and after the announcements at the sample banks and a control group of peer banks. Their findings do not 
show any evidence of unusual deposit withdrawals or spread increases at the sample banks following the 
announcements of enforcement actions. These results suggest that depositors were not sensitive to 
enforcement actions, nor did they alter their behavior when formal actions were announced. 
In contrast, Cummins et al. (2006) show in their analysis, which covers all publicly reported banking and 
insurance operational risk events which affected a total of 403 bank and 89 insurance company events in the 
U.S. from 1978 to 2003, and which caused operational losses of at least $10 million, a strong, statistically 
significant negative stock price reaction to announcements of operational loss events. Other studies also reveal 
that operational loss events have a strong, statistically significant negative stock price impact on announcing 
firms (Cummins et al., 2005; Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005). 
My study relates partly to recent research on personal liability for financial misconduct, as well as the effects 
of misconduct on CEO compensation and on the determinants and economics of corporate misconduct. 
For example, Karpoff et al. (2008) examine the fortunes of all 2,206 individuals identified as responsible 
parties for all 788 SEC and DoJ enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from January 1, 1978 
through September 30, 2006. They report that 93 percent lost their jobs by the end of the regulatory 
enforcement period. Most were certainly fired. The likelihood of redundancies increases with the cost of the 
misconduct to shareholders and the quality of the firm's governance. This is motivated by prior research which 
shows that firm shareholders endure large losses when their firms are accused of misconduct; but there is little 
evidence on whether the individual perpetrators suffer direct financial costs for the damages they caused. 
As for the factors related to the propensity to engage in financial misconduct, extant literature has pointed to a 
lack of monitoring by the board (Beasley, 1996; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Hegde 
and Zhou, 2014; Khanna et al., 2014) outside investors (Wang et al., 2010), or various other parties (Dyck et 
al., 2010; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). Hence, the literature primarily studies litigation and fraud from the 
perspective of corporate governance on the role and design of corporate boards (e.g., Adams et al., 2010; 
Coles et al., 2012, 2014; Field et al. 2013; Minton et al., 2014; Hagendorff et al., 2015a, 2015b). My study is 
also partly related to the studies on governance and risk taking in the banking industry (Beltratti and Stulz, 
2012; Adams and Ragunathan, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Minton et al., 2014). Relative to other bank 
risk measures studied in the literature, enforcement actions provide a suitable identification of the 
effectiveness of internal governance. This is because enforcement actions provide an unambiguous external 
indicator of undesirable conduct in the industry. 
A number of studies link fraud to the compensation of executives (e.g., Johnson et al., 2009). The often-
mentioned misconduct by CEOs documented in the literature has been manipulating short-term performance 
to enjoy higher payouts. Persons (2006), who examines the impact of fraud and lawsuit revelations on U.S. 
top executive turnover and compensation, shows that out of all financial firms involved in fraud only a small 
number reduced their executive cash compensation and only a tiny percentage changed their top executives. 
Apart from questions related to financial misconduct and whether the bank board matters for firm outcomes, it 
was misconduct in the mortgage markets that received much attention following the recent financial crisis, 
primarily in the legal literature, and to a lesser extent in the financial literature. Much of the literature 
examines the main legal issues that will play an important role in the extensive litigation in the residential 
mortgage market including a) the Rule 10b-5 class-action lawsuits that have already been filed against the 
banks pending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974) (ERISA) litigation, b) the causes-of-
action available to mortgage-backed security (hereafter MBS) and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) 
purchasers, and c) litigation against the rating agencies (see Bethel et al., 2008). 
In contrast to the existing literature, my key question is the following. Which observable bank characteristics, 
are most closely correlated with bank propensity to face litigation? In particular, I analyze “too big to jail” 
issue and whether it is observed in the data that large banks were more often involved in financial misconduct 
and whether litigation charges had any impact on the banks’ probability of insolvency. Certainly, the quality 
of the board is the missing variable in my analysis, but I hope to capture this omitted variable by including 
fixed effects in my regressions. 
Some evidence points to the fact that until recently the federal government shielded big banks from criminal 
prosecution. The government was concerned that convictions may damage the financial system. One of the 
top Federal Reserve officials explicitly acknowledged this practice, which was long denied by the Obama 
administration.11 Both Republican and Democratic lawmakers have long suspected that federal prosecutors 
did not pursue guilty pleas because they were afraid of the consequences, i.e. that the potential unraveling of a 
giant bank would endanger the global economy. For example, in 2012 the U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder 
posited that it becomes difficult for the DoJ to prosecute financial institutions that have become so large that 
criminal charges would “have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” 
Certain charges, such as money laundering, could potentially cut a bank off from existing pools of investors 
such as pension funds and ultimately cost the bank its charter to operate in the United States. Holder’s 
testimony sparked criticism that just as the federal government had deemed some banks “too big to fail” 
during the financial crisis, so too had the DoJ determined that some banks were “too big to jail.” Holder later 
denied his previous comments after a public outcry in March 2013. Another statement: “We were not willing 
to find those firms guilty before, because we were worried that if we found them guilty, that could somehow 
potentially destabilize the financial system,” was made by the president of Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
William Dudley.12 For that reason, it has been reported that corporations are sometimes able to agree with the 
Department of Justice (hereafter DoJ) to have an offshore entity take the hit and enter the guilty plea. Such 
was the case in 2012, when UBS agreed to pay about $1.5 billion to settle LIBOR rigging charges, and a unit 
in Japan, where much of the wrongdoing occurred, pleaded guilty to criminal fraud. 
There exist other media and government reports that found widespread regulatory failures at the Federal 
Reserve, specifically at Dudley’s branch in New York. Former New York Fed employee Carmen Segarra also 
                                                          
11 The notion that government shielded big banks from prosecution has been addressed in Huffington Post on 21 
November, 2014, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/21/fed-too-big-to-jail_n_6201476.html. 
12 Ibid. 
released tapes showing higher-ups at the New York Fed ordering lower-level regulators to go easy on 
Goldman Sachs.13 
However, I am not aware of any empirical studies that examine this issue of “too big to jail”, nor of any 
analysis that would examine the effect of criminal charges against large financial institutions on the global 
economy or systemic risk, potentially undermining a key DoJ argument for why the world’s biggest banks 
have escaped indictment. 
Putting the “too big” rhetoric aside, the obvious fact is that no corporate entity can literally be “jailed.” If for 
example the DoJ does pursue criminal charges against an entity, a common outcome is a settlement coupled 
with large fines. For instance, in 2012, HSBC agreed to a deferred prosecution agreement with the DoJ to 
settle allegations of money laundering. In that settlement, HSBC was required to pay $1.92 billion in 
forfeiture and fines, but avoided actual criminal indictment. All the above motivates me to examine whether 
large banks were more actively engaged in wrongdoing and how litigation settlements related to the size of the 
banks. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I found that large banks had higher systemic risk, were more opaque and securitized more 
often. In this chapter, I want to examine whether large banks have lower operating costs and whether they 
were involved in financial misconduct and faced litigation charges more frequently than smaller banks. 
1.3 Data and Variables Construction 
The data, in particular, FR-9YC forms, are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago via WRDS. 
The core sample is a panel of all publicly traded U.S. BHCs that report on form FR-9YC,14 which is filed 
quarterly on a consolidated basis by all U.S. BHCs with over $150 million in assets ($500 million after 2006). 
I examine BHCs with over $500 million in total assets because BHCs with total consolidated assets of less 
than $500 million are generally not required to file FR-9YC forms. 
The FR-9YC reports contain detailed consolidated financial statements and other data for U.S. BHCs. As 
noted earlier, in March 2006, the minimum reporting size for BHCs was increased from $150 million to $500 
million. This significantly skews the sample. To overcome this problem, I delete all the observations that do 
not reach the minimum reporting threshold over the sample period. I do this in order to make sure that banks 
that began reporting prior to 2006 have continued reporting since the threshold was raised from $150 million 
to $500 million in 2006. I adjust the threshold of $500 million for price level per quarter with base March 
2006. This method of deleting the observations ensures that they are not deleted randomly, and helps to 
preserve all BHC observations that once started reporting and continue to do so even after a temporary drop in 
their total assets. I delete approximately 50 observations per quarter. My data set covers the period from 
2001:Q2 to 2013:Q4. 
                                                          
13Tapes were retrieved from http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/536/the-secret-recordings-of-
carmen-segarra on 6 June, 2014. 
14BHCs are companies that own or control one or more commercial banks. Most banks in the U.S. are owned by BHCs. 
Currently, about 84 percent of commercial banks in the U.S. are part of a BHC structure. 
I use the detailed information on the vast range of BHCs’ non-interest expenses filed by BHCs in the 
memoranda of their quarterly regulatory FR-9YC filings. Since 2001, more than one-third of total non-interest 
expenses are classified in the FR-9YC as part of a broad “other non-interest expenses” category. The category 
“other non-interest expenses” represents more than one-third of industry non-interest expenses. The 11 
standardized memoranda categories are: (i) data processing expenses; (ii) advertising and marketing expenses; 
(iii) directors' fees; (iv) printing, stationery and supplies; (v) postage; (vi) legal fees and expenses; (vii) FDIC 
insurance assessments; (viii) accounting and auditing expenses; (ix) consulting and advisory expenses; (x) 
ATM and interchange expenses; (xi) telecommunications expenses (see FR-9YC Schedule HI Memorandum 
Item 7). In addition, space is provided for BHCs to report additional “write-in” expense items that were not 
captured by the standardized fields and where the expense item exceeds 10 percent of total other non-interest 
expenses. This can be travel expenses, payments to insurance holders, software development, litigation 
settlements or even meals, as was reported by some smaller BHCs. BHCs record items for amounts greater 
than $25,000 that also exceed 3 percent of total other non-interest expenses. Note that non-interest expenses 
do not include loan losses due to defaults, trading losses, gains and losses on owned securities, or taxes; these 
are recorded in other parts of the income statement. 
As for the three biggest other non-standardized fields, they pose some difficulties. It is particularly 
challenging to classify and analyze items recorded in the write-in expense fields, because they are reported 
using non-standardized language by each BHC. Therefore, I manually examined more than 30,000 text strings 
in the Schedule HI of FR-9YC. This involved manually skimming through about 5,500 individual “write-in” 
text fields reported by individual BHCs. That is, I examine more than 5,000 various expenses, manually typed 
by BHCs. I search for words which include settlements actions, litigation and alike. Banks do not use uniform 
names and there are significant numbers of typos. Some reported write-in items are difficult to interpret. For 
instance, while I can easily infer that litigation means litigation, other expenses may be less straightforward. In 
the end I am left with 341 litigation occurrences where expenses are first, second or third as identified in 
“Other non-interest expenses”, which constitute more than 10 percent of other expenses. I drop ambiguous 
observations. I identify 130 “clean” occurrences where banks face litigation costs as the first highest item, 123 
as second highest, and 90 as third highest. Text usually appeared as “INCOME ON LITIGATION 
SETTLEMENT”, “RECOVERY ON LEGAL EXPENSES”, “LAWSUIT SETTLEMENT”, “INCOME 
FROM LITIGATION SETTLEMENT”, “LITIGATION SETTLEMENT”, or “LEGAL SETTLEMENT”. 
Sometimes I observe the reason for the payment, e.g. “LAWSUIT TO A SOFTWARE VENDOR & THIS IS 
SETTLEMENT” or “IRS SETTLEMENT EXPENSES TO BE PAID”. Note on the legal expenses: I do not 
aggregate legal fees and litigation settlement here. Some part of this finding may reflect the fact that small 
banks may lack internal legal teams, for which legal expenses would be recorded as part of compensation, and 
thus have higher external legal fees. 
Although some data on the charges faced by institutions and chief executive officers (hereafter CEOs) or chief 
financial officers (hereafter CFOs) are available on the SEC website,15 there is no central database that 
                                                          
15Limited data on the charges faced by institutions and their CEOs and CFOs are available on the SEC website 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml. 
includes all of the litigation charges faced by banks. Bank regulators, specifically the Fed, the OCC, and the 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) are the main bodies dealing with banks’ wrongdoing 
and some data are available. Also, the FDIC’s Legal Division provides some aggregate information. However, 
the institution does not report PLC cost and recovery information by individual institution. Thus, that 
information cannot be used. 
Quantifying all the litigation settlements is difficult as a single event may lead to numerous overlapping 
investigations and proceedings, either by multiple federal and state agencies and officials in the U.S., or in 
some instances by regulators and other governmental officials in non-U.S. jurisdictions (e.g. Citigroup in 
Japan). Therefore, for analysis of the litigation settlements, I rely entirely on the FR- 9YC forms only. 
I proceed by eliminating observations with missing, negative or zero values for total assets, and observations 
where the loans to assets ratio exceeds 100 percent. Observations that report zero equity capital are also 
removed. Approximately 50 observations are deleted per quarter. In turn, I winsorize the independent and 
dependent variables at the 1 percent level to account for data errors and limit the effect of potential outliers, 
which is a standard procedure in similar studies. 
As far as the independent variables (efficiency ratios and detailed expenses) in the first part of this essay are 
concerned, I proceed as follows. Typically, BHCs enter expenses with a positive sign, while some entries have 
a negative sign, thus I use my judgment and convert them into positive or leave those observations as missing. 
In total, I have changed the sign for 67 entries where expenses are written with a negative sign, because the 
majority of BHCs write expenses in positive terms, understanding that these are the expenses. It is reasonable 
to believe that a typo in the sign may have occurred.  
Subsequently, to analyze stock prices and returns, I link FR-9YC forms with CRSP. I used the FRBNY link16 
to match regulatory identification numbers (RSSD ID) to the PERMCO, used by the CRSP. The RSSD ID is a 
unique identifier assigned to commercial banks or BHCs by the Federal Reserve. The dataset yields 769 
PERMCO-RSSD links from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2013. 
1.3.1 Dependent variables 
Just as in calculating the efficiency ratio, where I divide non-interest expenses by net income (interest plus 
non-interest income), I calculate ratios for all the expenses dividing the expenses by the bank’s net income. 
Thereby, I obtain 14 separate efficiency measures that are used as dependent variables. 
1.3.2 Control variables 
Apart from the main variable of interest such as the logarithm of total assets or the size, the control variables 
in the first specification include BHCs’ non-performing loans (a proxy for credit risk), capital level (Tier 1) 
and profitability; relative profitability (the bank’s financial performance relative to its peers over the past three 
years (RELROE) is also used as a proxy for the quality of its management,17 a variable used by DeYoung and 
                                                          
16 FRBNY link is available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html. 
17 RELROE equals bank i’s ROE minus the median ROE among the banks in bank i’s asset class, calculated each year 
from t-3 through t-1 and then averaged. I used five asset classes: less than $100 million; $100 million to $500 million; 
$500 million to $1 billion; $1 billion to $10 billion; and more than $10 billion, all measured in 2001 dollars. I note that 
Rice (2004) to approximate for management quality. The aim is to relax the omitted variable bias, if the 
quality of the bank’s management correlates with both size and expenses. Apart from the standard control 
variables mentioned above. I also control for the asset shares held in various types of loans and assets. For 
instance, I include trading assets, securities, cash, fixed assets. I also include bank revenue composition. 
Copeland (2012) finds that there is a positive relationship between the relative importance of nontraditional 
income sources and asset size. Copeland (2012) classifies income into three types: traditional, securitization, 
and nontraditional. These categories are constructed so that income earned from new financial services would 
fall into either the securitization or nontraditional category. The traditional category contains the classic 
sources of income that most banks have relied upon over time, such as interest and fee income on loans, 
service charges on deposit accounts, fees for providing payment services, and income from fiduciary 
activities. Nontraditional income comes from five sources: a) net interest income from trading assets; b) 
venture capital revenues; c) investment banking; d) insurance income; and e) trading revenues. The 
securitization category captures income related to creating, servicing or selling securitized assets, while the 
nontraditional category contains sources of income related to the capital markets. 
Following previous research (deYoung and Rice, 2003), I include the share of income that banks derive from 
interest income, investment banking income, trading income and fiduciary income (including insurance 
activities related income), three of which constitute a lion’s share of revenue composition. I also include other 
income (e.g. safe deposit box rent, income and fees from ATMs, income and fees from the printing and sales 
of checks and miscellaneous income) among the control variables. I also include the ratio of deposits to total 
assets because banks still heavily rely on deposits, including those banks that are regarded as severely 
diversified banks. I also include the amount of securitized assets. 
Furthermore, following DeYoung (2014), I include the ratio of full-time-employees-to-total assets as a proxy 
for personalized service or as a proxy for human error in the workplace. I significantly vary a number of 
control variables to capture various aspects of banks’ performance. I also include banks’ foreign loans to 
capture their exposure to foreign individuals, firms and governments. I also control for BHC complexity using 
the complexity indicators from the Fed database. The FED categorizes BHCs into various complexity 
categories.18 Finally, I scale variables by the size of the BHC. 
                                                          
RELROE may reflect things other than bank management quality, such as the local competitive, economic, and 
regulatory conditions faced by the bank during the past three years. However, I expect that the time dummies and state 
dummies in my regressions should absorb much of this variation. 
18As noted on the FRB’s website, for small BHCs with total consolidated assets of $5 billion or less, attributes rows with 
date starting on or after 01/01/2002 must use values from 3 to 8 for complex institutions. A value of 2 should be used for 
any size company to indicate noncomplex institutions, unless there are factors that indicate complexity and that have 
been overridden by supervisory judgment, in which case a value of 9 should be used. The complexity indicators are the 
following: 3 = Complex: Nonbank Financial Factors. Nature and scale of non-bank activities warrant designation as 
complex for supervisory purposes; 4 = Complex: High Risk Activities. Company engages, either directly or through its 
subsidiaries, in significant non-banking activity having an inherently high-risk profile. Examples include securities 
broker/dealer activities, insurance underwriting and merchant banking; other activities may also trigger this designation if 
identified by the supervisory Reserve Bank as high-risk in nature; 5 = Complex: Public Debt. Company issues significant 
debt to the general public such that unsophisticated investors may be at risk of loss; 6 = Complex: Management Factors. 
Management practices such as the nature of inter-company transactions or centralized risk management policies and 
procedures warrant designation as complex for supervisory purposes; 7 = Complex: Multiple Factors. Company meets 
two or more criteria for the complex designation, more than one of which are material in the judgment of the supervisory 
Reserve Bank. While the intensity of the supervisory approach may not differ from other complex companies, this 
In one subsection where I analyze bank litigation, I also use the systemic risk measure MES from VLab 
linking it with the BHCs’ data set from the Fed. 
1.4 Summary Statistics 
1.4.1 Non-interest expenses 
Summary statistics for the main variables used in this study are reported in Table 1. In what follows, I present 
the distinguishing features of the BHCs’ non-interest expenses. 
I observe that compensation constitutes the highest non-interest expense, followed by other expenses on fixed 
assets and premises, data processing, and advertising and marketing expenses. For banks which report other 
“first highest”, “second highest” and “third highest” expenses, these expenses can be as high as banks’ 
expenditure on compensation. I sort other non-interest expenses and observe the following. In general, 
univariate findings show that litigation expenses are high in total magnitude, and they predominantly appear 
on the FR-9YC forms of the largest BHCs. The highest non-standardized other non-interest expenses are those 
of METLIFE, INC. in the amount of $35, 257.253 for “POLICY BENEFITS ON INSURANCE 
PRODUCTS”. Metlife dominates the highest expenses. This seems natural because this is an insurance-based 
industry, and thus their expenses are likely to appear in other non-classified expenses. 
Among the other highest expenses for large banks when not divided by bank size, I find that merger and 
acquisition, and restructuring costs constitute a significant part of all expenses for the Bank of America. Also, 
foreclosure expenses, operating losses and travel expenses are frequently mentioned by large and small banks. 
Other significant “highest expenses” are those of American Express where card member rewards constitute a 
company’s other highest expenditure. However, when I scale the above expenses by operating revenue, other 
ratios appear to dominate the overall picture of the highest expenses. I present the ratios because from the 
whole economy’s perspective especially when one considers litigation settlements that accrue to the 
regulatory agencies or are repaid as compensation to victims of financial crime, while the ratios might be 
more interesting for inter-bank comparisons. 
When I examine the expense ratios, I observe that for some BHCs among highest “other expenses” are 
underwriting and distribution expenses, death claims, travel expenses and entertainment, fraud losses, Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (hereafter OCC) fund, supervisory examination fees, reserves, compliance, 
charitable contributions; marketing and servicing fees on payday loans are also listed among the highest 
expenses. Among “other expenses”, acquisitions fees, provision for government investigations and loss 
provision, and state franchise tax are also frequently mentioned. 
Data on expenses also provide an insight into the occurring trends from 2001 to 2014. For example, I note that 
the number of full-time employees per dollar of operating income has fallen precipitously over time, while 
industry-wide labor expenses have declined only marginally and have actually increased at the average bank. 
                                                          
designation alerts examiners to the presence of more than one factor; 8 = Complex: Supervisory Judgment. Company 
does not appear to be complex as described in SR 02-01, however, at the discretion of the supervisory Reserve Bank, it is 
designated as a complex organization for supervisory purposes. 
These conflicting trends provide evidence that new banking products and production methods require a more 
highly skilled work force and, hence, higher salaries and benefits to attract and retain these workers. For 
example, while low-wage bank tellers have become less necessary due to ATMs and online banking, high-
wage finance and information professionals have become more necessary to manage these systems and the 
growing array of products offered around them. 
Data also reveal a stable upward trend in AME scaled by bank total assets from 2001 to 2014. I observe that 
during and after the 2007–2009 crisis in contrast to the number of employees and compensation or litigation 
expenses, AME have not exhibited any cyclical behavior, i.e. AME have not undergone any drastic cuts, and 
have been been relatively stable over the entire sample period with only a moderate decrease during the crisis.  
As far as the complexity indicator is concerned, the majority of BHCs in my sample are classified as non-
complex institutions, i.e. 171,908 observations are of Complexity=2; 5,895 are Complexity=9; 2,179 are 
BHCs which have Complexity=6; 978 are Complexity= 8; 1,084 are Complexity=7. 
Among other features, univariate statistics show significant differences between small and large banks. For 
example, small BHCs received over 60 percent of their nontraditional income from investment banking. In 
contrast, medium and large BHCs relied upon trading revenue, investment banking and insurance income to 
roughly the same extent. Further, net interest income from trading assets is substantially higher for medium 
and large BHCs relative to small ones. I also find that the MES was higher for larger banks. 
1.4.2 Litigation 
Summary statistics for banks involved in litigation and those which were not involved in litigation are 
presented in Table 2. In Table 3a. I observe that 2004 was a relatively litigious year in terms of the magnitude 
of litigation settlements. Then from 2004 onward up to the financial crisis, there was relatively little litigation 
followed by a boom of litigation after 2008. In particular, I observe an unprecedented average litigation 
amount from 2010 onward. Recent evidence in the press shows that 2014 has been even more litigious; 
however my data sample ends at 2014. What I do observe in Table 2a is that some banks face litigation 
settlements continuously over many quarters. 
As for the litigation sample, I have 341 litigation occurrences with 118 BHCs involved in them. One 
limitation on carrying out a more thorough analysis is that FR-9YC forms do not have standardized entries to 
report why some litigation settlements have occurred; only two or three entries provide detailed information. I 
also note that in my analysis I focus only on monetary costs because it is impossible to capture other costs 
(e.g. prohibition for banks to pay out dividends or any other non-monetary punishment or losses from pending 
litigation that may also prevent banks from engaging into profitable businesses or raising debt). 
Hence, I have 118 banks that paid litigation settlements one or more times and which were a significant, i.e. 
more than 10 percent of other highest non-interest expenses, amount of their expenses and thus were reported 
in 9-YC forms, BHCs that appear to be continuously facing significant litigation settlements include: Discover 
Financial Services, Goldman Sachs, First Bancorp of Durango, Chinatrust Corp. or CTBC Capital Corp., 
Synovus Financial Corp., CIB Marine Bancshares Inc., International Bancshares Corp., Citigroup Inc., Bank 
of America Corp. (primarily claims from the financial crisis tied to the sale of mortgage-backed securities that 
defaulted) and JPMorgan Chase&CO.  
1.5 Methodology 
To examine the relationship between banks’ size and their operating costs, I estimate regressions with BHC-
fixed effects, and time dummies. Thus I examine only changes in size within BHCs. I use fixed effects to 
capture characteristics specific to the banks that are fixed; for example, a bank’s culture. I also cluster error 
terms at the BHC level to allow for correlation in the error terms within the BHCs. I also follow previous 
studies (e.g. Stiroh, 2006; Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu et al., 2011) and have my explanatory variables 
lagged one period to relax potential problems of endogeneity. 
The model specification is as follows: 
ExpenseRatio??,?? =??i∗(Size)i,??-1+ ????∗(Controls)??,??-1 +qt+vi+ ????,??                                  (1) 
I begin with standard control variables and then I control for more factors such as the composition of BHC 
assets, the composition of revenue, funding structure, concentration and banks’ complexity. 
I then proceed to the litigation regressions. 
I estimate several probit and logit regressions to examine the likelihood that banks with certain characteristics 
will engage in more wrongdoing and be detected. 
Pr(Litigation=1) = ??i∗(Size)i,??-1+ ??j∗(Controls)??,??-1 +qi,t+ ????,t                              (2) 
I also run simple panel regressions with BHC-fixed effect and time dummies clustered at BHC level to see 
whether litigation settlements increase with bank size. 
LitigationAmount??,?? =??i∗(Size)i,??-1+ ??j∗(Controls)??,??-1 +qi,t+ vi,t + ????,??                                    (3) 
My control variables include banks’ size, profitability, leverage, credit risk, capital level, portfolio risk (risk-
weighted assets), auditing fees as higher expenditures in auditing may diminish litigation risk, employees to 
total assets ratio, compensation in banks, because more workers are likely to reduce strategic errors and better 
paid workers may have more incentives to exert more effort, and opacity levels and complexity levels. I also 
include foreign loans since dealing in foreign jurisdictions can significantly affect legal risk.19    Among other 
variables, I include securitized assets because they have been at the center of the recent litigation debate 
surrounding mortgage markets. 
I examine banks’ characteristics and examine whether the negative change in some of them stimulates banks 
to engage in financial wrongdoing as a means of boosting their performance. For instance, the corporate fraud 
                                                          
19 Legal risk is subsumed in operational risk. Examples of operational risk events include the Nasdaq odd-eighths pricing 
scandal in 1994, the 1995 bankruptcy of Barings Bank due to a rogue trader, the brokerage firm conflict of interest 
scandal in 2002, and the 1990s fines and lawsuits against Prudential Financial for misleading sales presentations. In 
response to these and other events, major institutions have been developing sophisticated operational risk measurement 
and management systems. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has also incorporated a new minimum capital 
charge for operational risk as part of the Basel II Capital Accord (Basel Committee, 2001), and major ratings firms have 
begun to consider operational risk in assigning corporate financial ratings (Moody’s Investors Service, 2003). 
literature suggests that a firm’s risk might relate to a firm’s tendency to commit wrongdoing. Many cases of 
misconduct are discovered when bank fundamentals indicate increased risk. For example, Povel et al. (2007) 
argue that CEOs of high-growth firms that exhibit a downturn are more likely to commit financial misconduct. 
Thus, I control for portfolio risk and systemic risk. In addition, some studies document that more systemically 
risky BHCs or banks with higher returns volatility or stock turnover may induce supervisors to monitor these 
banks more closely (Wang, 2013); thus I include stock returns and returns volatility to account for the 
probability of higher detection. In addition, I estimate other regressions that may provide some further insight 
into bank litigation issues. For example, it has been noted that litigation and uncertainty surrounding potential 
liability may depress a bank’s stock price. Therefore, I regress BHC stock prices on their litigation 
settlements. 
1.6 Results 
1.6.1 Economies of scale 
In Table 4 the coefficient of non-interest expense is negative and statistically significant, which which shows 
that there are significant economies of scale for large banks.  In particular, when I disaggregate expenses, I 
find that larger BHCs enjoy lower Compensation, Expenses on Premises and Fixed Assets, Data Processing 
Expenses, Directors Fees, Postage Expenses, Accounting and Auditing Expenses, Consulting and Advisory 
Expenses and Legal fees (all coefficients are negative and statically significant). 
   Some results are intuitive. For example, large BHCs can enjoy lower postage expenses, consulting or 
auditing, or data processing, because large BHCs are able to spread the fixed component of these costs over a 
larger total base of operating revenue or total assets. As for legal expenses, many large BHCs have their own 
legal departments and thus it is normal that their expenses are lower compared to those of smaller BHCs that 
have to use external legal services. The negative coefficient on compensation is however surprising. Large 
banks enjoy economies of scale in compensation that is a significant part of the total non-interest expenses. I 
did not expect to observe economies of scale on compensation. 
   As for other results, I observe diseconomies of scale in the following areas: amortization and goodwill 
expenses, FDIC deposit insurance assessments, printing and stationery supplies and AME. For the first two 
categories, I do not have any economic interpretation of why this might be the case. However, for FDIC 
insurance premiums assessments, it is possible that FDIC takes into account the possible contagion risk 
stemming from the large banks, implicit “too big to fail” guarantees and relaxed market monitoring of large 
banks, resulting in higher premiums being charged to these banks. This however changes once I include 
deposits (the estimated coefficient remains negative although not statistically significant). This coefficient is 
likely to shrink further if my regression specification includes a control for the fraction of insured deposits, 
rather than total deposits. As for AME, the fact that larger banks have higher AME may be because reputation 
may play a huge stake and thus big banks choose to have expensive billboards and flashy logos. 
To conclude, I observe significant economies and diseconomies of scale for large BHCs once I split expenses 
into sub-categories. Overall, I cannot conclude that bank expenses will skyrocket if large banks are split into 
smaller banks. These results remain robust after I include more control variables (Tables 5 and 6). 
I emphasize that a number of caveats apply to my results. My reduced form of statistical correlations supports 
the existence of significant economies of scale in the banking sector. Caution, however, should be exercised 
when drawing a causal interpretation from them. Although my regressions control for a wide range of BHC 
characteristics, firm size may still correlate with omitted variables that are also associated with lower 
expenses, such as the quality of management, since above average profitability might not fully capture the 
quality of management. This caveat however also seems to apply more generally to the existing literature on 
scale economies in banking. 
1.6.2 Litigation 
I find that larger BHCs are more often involved in litigation settlements. Regarding BHCs’ characteristics and 
litigation, I find that size is the only variable which would be associated with the probability of facing 
litigation charges as well as higher litigation settlement amounts, and it is robust across all specifications 
(probit and logit and OLS regressions in Tables 7- 9). 
That is, in contrast to the legal fees, which decrease as banks grow in size, I find that litigation settlements 
relate positively to bank size, which means that large banks face larger penalties. This contradicts the 
statements that larger banks continuously avoid charges or face lower punishment. Certainly, to examine this 
issue in more detail and address Dudley’s statements that large banks often could avoid all charges for all their 
wrongdoing, I would need to have data on the reasons why banks faced these charges. Regrettably, this is 
limited by data availability as only a small number of banks fill this information into “other expenses” on FR-
9YC forms. 
In turn, in Table 7, I also find that systemic risk is positive and statistically significant in litigation regressions. 
That is, more systemically risky banks are also more likely to be involved in misconduct.  
In Table 9, I also find that a higher foreign loans ratio increases the litigation amount. This may be because 
banks lending to other banks are exposed to the rules of foreign jurisdictions and naturally face higher 
uncertainty. I also observe that the litigation amount significantly increases with investment banking income 
and insurance related activities such as fiduciary income (Table 8 and Table 9). This is intuitive as investment 
banking and insurance activities are more complex activities than for example simple deposit taking and thus 
they carry more legal risk. Interestingly and contrary to my expectations, opacity (the bid–ask spread) is not 
significant in litigation regressions (Table 8). This result is an avenue for future study. 
I also observe that banks that have a higher credit risk (i.e. non-performing loans) have higher litigation costs, 
which may be an indication that banks that have a higher credit risk engage in more wrongdoing (Tables 7-9). 
This may seem intuitive if for example banks that have more non-performing loans anticipated that these non-
performing loans would turn into charge-offs and banks are trying to engage in some activities to generate 
higher revenues to cover potential future losses. I also find that BHCs with more employees have a lower risk 
of facing litigation charges. This may indicate that more workers reduce human error or that more employees 
may provide better monitoring and better discipline within the bank; consequently, the bank faces fewer 
litigation charges. In addition, higher compensation is also negatively correlated with litigation settlement 
amounts, which from the perspective of operational risk suggests that more workers and better paid workers 
may reduce errors in the bank and reduce the amount of litigation settlements (Table 8). 
I also observe that when small banks face litigation charges these are usually smaller than charges faced by 
large banks, possibly indicating that small BHCs engage in less severe wrongdoing since they do not have the 
“too big to jail” implicit cover; high fines may force them straight into terminating their businesses (Tables 7-
8). In addition, I find that higher legal fees correlate negatively with litigation settlements, which suggests that 
it may be worth hiring more expensive lawyers (7); however, results are not persistent across different 
specifications. Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that litigation is the new cost of doing business and it 
is important to account for it when considering the design of new financial regulations. 
1.7 Robustness Checks 
The efficiency ratio may be distorted in periods when net operating income is temporarily low, such as for 
example during the 2007–2009 crisis. Therefore, I test the sensitivity of my results to other normalizations of 
non-interest expenses, for example, by dividing the expenses by the level of capital. However, the results 
remain unchanged. 
As for the litigation section of this chapter, my major concern is the sample selection bias and the assumption 
that the detection of bank misconduct is perfect. That is, I can only observe the detected misconduct (once an 
enforcement action has been issued), but not the population of all committed cases of misconduct. This has 
also been pointed out by Zingales et al. (2010). They note that by focusing on discovered frauds, two biases 
are introduced. First, I do not observe frauds that were committed but which were never detected. Second, I do 
not observe fraud which was detected but which never entered the public domain. Also, since the data 
available are only about the cost of the litigation, I cannot draw any conclusions as to whether banks were 
punished proportionately to the severity of their committed crime. However, Zingales et al. (2010) note that 
the intense public scrutiny of large U.S. firms, the ability to go back in time and sue based on past 
wrongdoing, and the strong incentives to sue by plaintiff lawyers is likely to diminish this problem. Therefore, 
there is so much one can do about it other than rely on efficiency of plaintiff lawyers and on the intense public 
scrutiny and hope that the detection of the bank misconduct is nearly perfect. 
Finally, I drop the 67 observations from my sample that have negative entries for expenses and rerun the 
regressions. This procedure does not result in significant changes in the coefficients of interest.  
1.8 Conclusion 
Legislative changes over the past decades have been conducive to BHCs becoming more complex by 
expanding in size and scope, as well as to increased engagement in cross-border and cross-state businesses. 
Following the recent financial crisis, there is still widespread concern that large banking firms remain “too big 
to fail”. There is no consensus, however, among the bank researchers on the optimal size of banks, and no 
clear evidence as to what effect imposing a cap on bank size will have on bank operating revenues. 
Control of expenses remains a high priority as regulatory costs continue to rise. Therefore, in this chapter I 
describe the typical structure of BHCs non-interest expenses and examine the areas in which large banks 
enjoy significant economies of scale. These are the benefits that could be lost if limits on bank size are 
imposed. 
My findings show that overall, large banks enjoy economies of scale. In particular, significant economies of 
scale are found in auditing, consulting and legal fees, as well as expenses on fixed assets and premises, 
compensation and data processing. These economies of scale are likely to be lost once banks are split up. I 
also show that not all costs decrease as banks grow in size. Therefore, the argument that breaking up big banks 
will result in skyrocketing operating costs may be exaggerated. In addition, I observe diseconomies of scale in 
amortization expenses, goodwill, FDIC insurance premiums, printing and stationery supplies and AME. 
What seems evident is that technological progress and investment in technologies may face difficult times. 
This is because it was predominantly large banks that invested in innovation as they had a large client base 
and resources to invest. If large banks are split into parts, technological progress might be more challenging to 
achieve. 
Limiting the size of banks could be an appropriate policy goal, but only if the benefits of doing so exceeded 
the attendant reductions in scale economies, e.g. if systemic risk is significantly reduced. 
Another important aspect in this discussion is whether this loss in economies of scale would constitute a 
deadweight economic loss. Unfortunately, this is a challenging aspect to evaluate. There is a possibility that 
large banking firms have a greater bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers and employees. Thus, they can 
enjoy lower operating costs. If cost differences are due only to bargaining power effects, then limiting the size 
of the largest BHCs would not necessarily generate deadweight economic loss, but would rather simply 
constitute a redistribution of resources from banks to the employees or external suppliers of banking services. 
As far as litigation risk is concerned, litigation costs play an important role in the discussion of breaking up 
“too big to jail” BHCs. My findings indicate that large banks face a higher probability of litigation risk, 
however, it is too early to affirm that litigation risk will decrease if the banks are broken up into bits. 
Misconduct in banking undermines the general public’s confidence in the safety and soundness of the banking 
sector. Thus, it seems rational to make those who were ultimately responsible for what went wrong in the 
bank personally liable for their mistakes so that the tab is not simply picked up by shareholders. In other 
words, instead of breaking up big banks, it seems more rational to impose harsher individual penalties for 
bankers to discipline them and generally to encourage more integrity in the banking sector until more data is 
gathered. In addition, personal liability is likely to reduce banks’ legal fees if bankers who are guilty for the 
financial misconduct of the banks had to pay these fees out of their own pockets. 
In general, the determinants of a bank’s misconduct is an important topic, which has wider implications for 
the broader economy. It would be interesting to examine whether various litigation charges and settlements 
have been proportionate to the severity of the misconduct, and whether large banks have been treated more 
favorably than smaller banks. As noted by Judge Rakoff (2015), there is usually a lack of proportionality 
between the fine imposed and the company’s annual profits. That topic is an avenue for future research when 
data becomes available. 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Table 1 - Summary statistics expenses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean ratio 
Compensation 75610 96440.25 950401.1 0 3.70e+07 .3641608 
Premises Fixed Assets 75604 21722.34 206761 0 8290000 .0933336   
Amortization 67987 4239.423 49875.96 0 2578000  .0052985  
Goodwill 67946 2642.991 134974.9 0 2.48e+07  .0049724  
Data Processing 67254 5054.459 72099.8 0 4482000 .0228452 
Advertising Marketing 67008 6532.368 83678.11 0 3147001 .0127717  
Director Fees 66578 60.33284 184.3265 0 24879 .0034494 
Printing Stationery 66836 726.5661 18359.98 0 1195000 .0058384  
Postage 66535 1035.279 17132.87 0 995443  .0036994  
FDIC deposits 45518 109.9999 3289.532 0 429941 .0021243  
Accounting Audit 25444 252.958 2542.272 0 175000 .0062782   
Consulting Advisory 25447 7301.448 117321.3 0 5613000 .0077305   
ATMs & int 25430 383.4751 2973.58 0 343292 0.0073766 
Telecommunication 25449 3928.305 59885.7 0 4573000 0.0084702 
Legal Exp 66427 1519.31 28289.14 0 2639000 0.0064727 
1st Highest Oth Exp 61600 27677.97 542624.3 0 3.53e+07 0.374028 
2nd Highest Oth Exp 53861 11322.69 140081.1 0 7406000 0.2858667 
3rd Highest Oth Exp 48793 5968.099 73882.97 0 3892000 0.1938448 
Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum value of the individual BHC’s time-series averages, and number of 
observations. 
  
Table 2 - Summary statistics for BHCs involved and not involved in litigation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Litigation=0 Litigation=1 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Size 75279 8287896 7.17e+07 7071 2.37e+09 341 3.76e+08 7.36e+08 164797 2.46e+09 
Capital 72995 13.38682 13.35549 .03 1581 324 12.71725 6.777708 1.02 62.56 
NPL 73303 8.355874 2.083561 0 18.11211 331 11.51087 3.491519 .6931472 18.12966 
Trading Revenue 74780 10413.03 303899.5 -2.62e+07 2.34e+07 339 1017138 2838635 -9791000 1.98e+07 
Net Operating Revenue 74561 276300.4 2616855 -18912 1.10e+08 336 1.08e+07 2.23e+07 2896 1.00e+08 
Non-interest Expenses 75269 177948.5 1687383 0 8.28e+07 341 7525112 1.59e+07 2041 8.01e+07 
Efficiency ratio 74558 .6823939 .2143139 -8.212121 12.16838 336 .7593116 .4116059 .2337783 6.63896 
Legal Expenses ratio 65400 .0064306 .0170324 -.7149621 1.316802 315 .015206 .0302485 0 .2505489 
Telecommunication Expenses 
ratio 
24587 .0084701 .0075394 -.0117451 .1985158 194 .0084888 .0072642 0 .037803 
ATMs Expenses ratio 24568 .0073988 .0115216 -.0061599 .1782112 194 .0045572 .0134489 0 .0755277 
Consulting Advisory ratio 24584 .0076742 .0152673 -.2149621 .6175857 194 .0148592 .018506 0 .0721549 
Accounting Audit ratio 24581 .0062886 .0097963 -.061368 .8739195 194 .004956 .0083302 0 .051311 
FDIC deposits ratio 45227 .0021179 .0087006 -.5975379 .3167956 173 .0037972 .0082395 0 .0437919 
Postage ratio 65507 .0037051 .0058237 -.0030697 .1157148 316 .0025144 .0042393 0 .0185767 
Printing Stationery Expenses 
ratio 
65808 .0058477 .0071442 0 .1034483 316 .0038925 .0063412 0 .0443821 
Director Fees ratio 65551 .0034574 .0065218 0 .3597786 315 .0017957 .004389 0 .025018 
Advertising Marketing ratio 65985 .0127467 .0130098 0 .2111835 316 .0179922 .0160383 0 .0851704 
Data Processing Expenses ratio 66224 .0228525 .0292929 -.1714015 4.237705 318 .0213154 .0193271 0 .0950718 
Goodwill I ratio 66913 .0047906 .0885366 0 6.116233 317 .0433404 .367834 0 6.06672 
Amortization Expenses ratio 66954 .0052831 .0169311 -.0121455 2.838158 317 .0085507 .010162 0 .0612818 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Litigation=0 Litigation=1 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Premises Fixed Assets ratio 74544 .0933528 .0367087 -.5767046 2.315182 336 .0890758 .0376916 .0187872 .2381724 
Compensation Expenses ratio 74559 .3642402 .0908435 -2.033144 6.036655 336 .3465381 .0978769 .1200493 .7290925 
Non-interest Expense ratio 74558 .6823939 .2143139 -8.212121 12.16838 336 .7593116 .4116059 .2337783 6.63896 
1st Highest Oth Exp ratio 40241 .3759505 .5693862 -3.872159 13.24824 336 .1437865 .2514334 .0000288 1.944388 
2nd Highest Oth Exp ratio 26242 .287942 .4552278 -4.776515 13.22171 299 .1037187 .1916743 .0000134 1.628918 
3rd Highest Oth Exp ratio 14755 .195432 .3257018 1.870 10.00693 208 .0812534 .1505938 .0000121 .8956813 
Employees ratio 75279 .0003077 .0003474 0 .0311525 341 .0002451 .0001691 .0000246 .002012 
Trading Income ratio 74061 .0020066 .0228647 -1.422907 .6141494 334 .02578 .0676629 -.149044 .542329 
Investment Banking income 
ratio 
28467 .0071592 .0476521 0 1.029981 210 .0250479 .044015 0 .300574 
Other Income ratio 65318 .0065406 .0163351 0 .8001625 315 .0032954 .0061996 0 .0434195 
Total Deposits ratio 72263 .7891008 .1120842 0 .9979186 328 .6787587 .1666667 .0385794 .9124814 
Foreign Loans ratio 74817 .0002949 .0041888 0 .2656964 339 .001889 .003892 0 .0169343 
Litigation settlements ratio      341 572726.3 1533824 47 1.11e+07 
Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum value of the individual bank time-series averages, and number of 
observations. This is done per observation, grouped by bank which have litigation settlements reported in the 9-YC forms and which do not at any point in time in the 
sample period of 2001Q2 to 2013 Q4. 
  
Table 3 - Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Variables Size 
Efficienc
y 
Compens
ation 
Premises 
Fixed 
Assets 
Amortiza
tion 
Goodwill 
I 
Data 
Processin
g 
Advertisi
ng 
Marketin
g 
Director 
Fees 
Printing 
Stationer
y 
Postage 
FDIC 
insuranc
e 
Accounti
ng Audit 
Consulti
ng 
Advisory 
ATMs& 
int 
Telecom
municati
on 
Size 1.0000                
Efficiency -0.0133* 1.0000               
Compensatio
n 
-0.1376* 0.7135* 1.0000              
Premises 
Fixed Assets 
-0.1055* 0.6110* 0.5281* 1.0000             
Amortization 0.1474* 0.1500* 0.0040 0.0813* 1.0000            
Goodwill I 0.0458* 0.4957* 0.0402* 0.0727* 0.0611* 1.0000           
Data 
Processing 
-0.0741* 0.1784* 0.1159* 0.0838* 0.0140* 0.0130* 1.0000          
Advertising 
Marketing 
0.1122* 0.1333* 0.1264* 0.1154* 0.0137* 0.0099 0.0818* 1.0000         
Director 
Fees 
-0.2234* 0.0688* 0.0883* 0.0512* -0.0358* 0.0075 0.0713* 0.0506* 1.0000        
Printing 
Stationery 
-0.2254* 0.1136* 0.1538* 0.1910* -0.0033 0.0090 0.0452* 0.1462* 0.2044* 1.0000       
Postage -0.0224* 0.0653* 0.0671* 0.0687* 0.0178* 0.0049 0.0297* 0.1603* 0.1440* 0.3574* 1.0000      
FDIC 
insurance 
0.0240* 0.3250* 0.2141* 0.1949* 0.0109 0.0638* 0.0918* 0.0488* 0.0895* 0.0911* 0.1175* 1.0000     
Accounting 
Audit 
-0.2758* 0.2833* 0.2634* 0.2722* -0.0412* 0.0257* 0.1231* -0.0439* 0.2327* 0.1097* 0.0202* 0.2542* 1.0000    
Consulting 
Advisory 
0.0927* 0.2382* 0.1549* 0.1493* 0.0696* 0.0579* 0.0666* 0.0295* -0.0023 -0.0549* -0.0401* 0.2270* 0.1329* 1.0000   
ATMs & int -0.1492* 0.0108 0.0226* 0.0292* -0.0257* -0.0284* -0.0346* 0.0300* 0.0398* 0.1301* 0.1698* -0.0058 0.0201* -0.0123 1.0000  
Telecommun
ication 
-0.0892* 0.2609* 0.3057* 0.3811* 0.0522* 0.0461* -0.0309* 0.0641* 0.0654* 0.2360* 0.1978* 0.0567* 0.1912* 0.0517* 0.1449* 1.0000 
Note: The table reports pairwise correlations between the main regression variables. * indicates significance at 1%. For the definition and construction of the variables see 
Appendix 1.  
Table 4 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Variables 
Non-Interest 
Expense 
Compensation 
Premises 
Fixed Assets 
Amortization 
Goodwill 
Imp.losses 
Data 
Processing 
Advertising& 
Marketing 
Director Fees 
Printing & 
Stationery 
Size 
-0.0806*** -0.0457*** -0.0150*** 0.00590*** 0.0228*** -0.00581*** -0.000826 -0.00975*** -0.0146*** 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 
1.721*** 0.955*** 0.293*** -0.0722*** -0.305*** 0.0967*** 0.0229*** 0.0148*** 0.0258*** 
(0.175) (0.072) (0.029) (0.008) (0.062) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 71,623 71,625 71,610 65,968 65,926 65,263 65,026 64,599 64,849 
R-squared 0.066 0.074 0.039 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.021 0.050 0.047 
Number of BHCS 3,008 3,008 3,008 2,926 2,926 2,925 2,924 2,925 2,925 
(continued below) 
1 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Variables Postage FDIC deposit ins.ass. Accounting & Audit ATMs Telecommunications Legal Fees 
Size 
-0.0105*** 0.00323*** -0.00263*** -0.00244** -0.000347 -0.00519*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 
0.0169*** -0.0448*** 0.0413*** 0.0357** 0.0111 0.0722*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.015) 
Observations 64,558 44,515 24,280 24,283 24,287 64,453 
R-squared 0.092 0.239 0.014 0.021 0.007 0.048 
Number of BHCs 2,924 2.659 1,442 1,442 1,442 2,925 
Note: The table presents an analysis of the relationship between size, measured by log of total assets, and efficiency ratio, defined as total non-interest expense normalized 
by net operating revenue. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Revenue composition variables are the rolling average for the absolute value of the income 
share over net operating revenue. See Appendix 1 for further detail on controls included in the models. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and two-way 
clustering by firm and quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
  
Table 5 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Variables 
Non-Interest 
Expense 
Compensation 
Premises & 
Fixed Assets 
Amortization 
Goodwill Imp. 
losses 
Data Processing 
Advertising & 
Marketing 
Director Fees 
Size 
-0.0860*** -0.0461*** -0.0155*** 0.00651*** 0.0244*** -0.00564*** -0.000514 -0.0124*** 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0189*** 0.00322*** 0.225*** 0.135* 0.00113 -0.0015 -0.00465*** 0.00642 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.027) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) 
Profitability 
-7.204*** -1.512*** -0.639*** -0.0870*** -2.175*** -0.204*** -0.00698 0.00713** 
(0.808) (0.168) (0.078) (0.013) (0.569) (0.060) (0.011) (0.003) 
Capital 
-5.140 5.880 -1.770 -5.760* 2.560 3.130 1.770 -1.990 
(4.740) (0.199) (1.130) (3.430) (2.250) (5.810) (1.620) (1.760) 
Constant 
1.668*** 0.938*** 0.285*** -0.0799*** -0.321*** 0.0965*** 0.0223*** 0.0176*** 
(0.136) (0.052) (0.022) (0.008) (0.066) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003) 
Observations 67863 67865 67851 62726 62731 62063 61875 61481 
R-squared 0.175 0.124 0.105 0.012 0.034 0.017 0.024 0.052 
Number of BHCs 2817 2817 2817 2733 2732 2734 2731 2732 
(continued on the next page) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variables 
Printing & 
Stationery 
Postage 
FDIC 
depositinsass 
Accounting & Audit Consulting & Advisory ATMs Telecom 
Size 
-0.0163*** -0.0103*** 0.00198*** -0.00310*** -0.00320*** -0.00236*** -0.000215 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0122 -9.900* 0.0106*** 0.292*** 0.00555*** 0.00203 -0.291 
(0.472) (0.527) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.818) 
Profitability 
-0.00194 0.00527 -0.222*** -0.0238** -0.0886*** -0.00608 -0.0152** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.067) (0.010) (0.024) (0.005) (0.007) 
Capital 
-0.471 -0.773 -0.585 -0.708 0.131 0.345 -0.310 
(0.938) (0.943) (0.131) (0.257) (0.114) (0.232) (0.282) 
Constant 
0.0278*** 0.0169*** -0.0343*** 0.0453*** 0.0428** 0.0321*** 0.00836 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
Observations 61702 61441 42543 23125 23128 23116 23132 
R-squared 0.05 0.096 0.283 0.018 0.032 0.044 0.009 
Number of BHCs 2731 2731 2589 1309 1309 1309 1309 
Note: The table presents an analysis of the relationship between size, measured by log of total assets, and efficiency ratio, defined as total non-interest expense normalized 
by net operating revenue. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Revenue composition variables are the rolling average for the absolute value of the income 
share over net operating revenue. See Appendix 1 for further detail on controls included in the models. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and two-way 
clustering by firm and quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
  
Table 6 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variables Efficiency Ratio ATMs Telecom. 
Consulting & 
Advisory 
Accounting & 
Audit 
FDIC insurance Postage 
Size 
-0.0616** -0.00274*** -0.000158 -0.00393*** -0.00329*** -0.00340 0.00334 
(0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Non-performing loans 
0.0207*** 0.00172 -1.990 0.00604*** 0.00265** 0.00829*** -2.700 
(0.003) (0.001) (8.200) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (4.980) 
Profitability 
-6.761*** -0.00197 -0.0112 -0.0879*** -0.0238** -0.422*** 0.00442 
(0.835) (0.005) (0.007) (0.025) (0.012) (0.118) (0.003) 
Capital 
-0.00129 3.280 -3.180 1.140 -1.750 -9.300 6.880 
(0.002) (2.340) (2.790) (0.975) (2.830) (1.310) (1.420) 
Total Deposits ratio 
0.0652 0.00311 0.000609 -0.00238 0.00161 0.0250** -0.00587** 
(0.088) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) 
Trading Assets ratio 
-0.0856 -0.00303 -0.000370 0.0286 -0.000896 -0.00379 0.00240 
(0.176) (0.007) (0.011) (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.004) 
Investments Real Estate 
Vent. 
0.627*** -0.0109 -0.00490 0.0112 0.0171*** -2.869*** 0.000940 
(0.220) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.771) (0.004) 
Total Loans ratio 
-0.290*** -0.00267 -0.00116 -0.00642** -0.00504*** -0.0321** 0.00117 
(0.051) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.001) 
Trading Income ratio 
-0.0843 0.00212 -0.00732 0.00140 0.000188 0.0145 -0.00498** 
(0.171) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) 
Fiduciary Income ratio 
0.491*** -0.00235 0.00897** 0.00380 -0.000292 0.00319 0.000381 
(0.098) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) 
lnvestment Banking 
Income ratio 
0.374** 0.00178 0.0130 0.0237 0.000420 0.00393 -0.0118*** 
(0.183) (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.022) (0.003) 
Other Income ratio 1.455*** 0.0798*** 0.0387*** 0.0109 0.0433*** 0.0420 0.0432*** 
(0.301) (0.031) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.036) (0.008) 
Employees ratio 
322.1*** -7.816** -0.395 -5.612 -2.871 -4.361 1.949 
(100.2) (3.736) (2.308) (7.265) (3.120) (9.373) (3.973) 
Constant 
1.404*** 0.0390*** 0.00728 0.0604*** 0.0512*** -0.0248 0.00283 
(0.402) (0.012) (0.009) (0.023) (0.012) (0.046) (0.006) 
Observations 24,341 21,501 21,516 21,512 21,509 7,471 24,341 
R-squared 0.115 0.056 0.016 0.035 0.026 0.371 0.139 
Number of BHCs 1,337 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,046 1,337 
(continued on next page) 
Note: The table presents an analysis of the relationship between size, measured by log of total assets, and efficiency ratio, defined as total non-interest expense normalized by net operating 
revenue. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Revenue composition variables are the rolling average for the absolute value of the income share over net operating revenue. 
See Appendix 1 for further detail on controls included in the models. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and two-way clustering by firm and quarter. Coefficients with 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Variables 
Printing & 
Stationery 
Director Fees 
Advertising & 
Marketing 
Data Processing 
Goodwill 
Imp.losses 
Amortization 
Premises & 
Fixed Assets 
Legal Fees 
Size 
0.0158*** -0.00221 0.00550*** -0.00430** 0.0617*** 0.00612*** -0.0151*** -0.00948*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Non-performing 
loans 
-1.000* -6.340 -0.00453*** 0.00660*** 0.00236 0.00222** 0.0241*** 0.0160*** 
(0.568) (5.370) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Profitability 
0.00970* 0.00498 0.000936 -0.0771*** -2.943*** -0.0557*** -0.392*** -0.128*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.018) (0.815) (0.014) (0.069) (0.024) 
Capital 
2.480 2.060 9.160** -3.910 5.720 -4.410 -7.890 -9.680 
(1.900) (1.790) (4.510) (4.450) (4.770) (4.807) (2.530) (7.500) 
Total Deposits 
ratio 
-0.00617*** -0.00297** -0.0100** 0.0152*** -0.153** -0.00303 0.0344*** 0.0142** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.075) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) 
Trading Assets 
ratio 
0.00632 0.00153 0.00821 -0.0345** 0.0252 0.000488 -0.00142 -0.00657 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.070) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025) 
Investments Real 
Estate Vent. 
0.00460 -0.00293 0.0141 -0.0369*** 0.180 0.00571 0.0730*** -0.0824*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009) (0.192) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018) 
Total Loans ratio 
0.00281*** 0.00203** 0.00197 -0.0131*** 0.0919*** -0.00166 -0.0379*** -0.0206*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) 
Trading Income 
ratio 
-0.00713*** 0.00141 -0.0129* 0.00584 -0.0103 -0.000419 -0.0238* 0.0152 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.034) (0.006) (0.014) (0.021) 
Fiduciary Income 
ratio 
0.00730** -0.000513 0.0117** 0.0419*** 0.00975 0.0204*** 0.0776*** -0.00300 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.072) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) 
Investment 
Banking Income 
ratio 
-0.00442 -0.00886** 0.00121 0.0319* 0.0123 0.00596 0.0502* 0.0254 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.018) (0.094) (0.018) (0.027) (0.031) 
Other Income ratio 
0.0445*** 0.0198*** 0.0191 0.0397 0.226 0.00552 0.288*** 0.0663*** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.029) (0.167) (0.017) (0.053) (0.019) 
Employees ratio 
0.360 -1.459* 25.87*** -3.140 103.0 8.413** -14.46 -10.24 
(1.535) (0.813) (7.106) (5.561) (77.030) (3.475) (11.790) (12.630) 
Constant 
-0.0122* 0.00716 -0.0583*** 0.0693*** -0.818*** -0.0736*** 0.286*** 0.125*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.016) (0.025) (0.283) (0.020) (0.058) (0.030) 
Observations 24,341 24,340 24,341 24,340 24,341 24,318 24,341 24,341 
R-squared 0.120 0.046 0.064 0.062 0.038 0.059 0.105 0.068 
Number of BHCs 1,337 1.337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 
Table 7 - BHCs’ size, systemic risk and litigation 
Note: This table presents results from probit, logit and OLS regressions of litigation on BHCs’ size and systemic risk. 
All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in 
parentheses. 
  
1 2 3 4 
 Logit Probit OLS 
Variables Litigation Litigation Litigation amount 
MES 
8.329 0.793*** -0.00462 
(6.384) (0.307) (0.697) 
Size 
5.960** 1.430*** 1.740*** 
(5.55)** (0) (0) 
Non-performing 
0.645** 0.00472 0.00997 
(0.267) (0.005) (0.013) 
Capital 
-0.171 0.000720 0.000141 
(0.118) (0.001) (0.002) 
Profitability 
-21.02 -0.637 -0.929 
(22.420) (0.563) (0.626) 
Constant 
-11.71*** -0.0742 (0.073) 
(3.538) (0.065) -0.143 
  (0.173) 
Observations 961 961 961 
Number of 31 31 31 
R-squared  0.07 0.139 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.306 0.209  
Table 8 - BHCs’ size, opacity and litigation 
1 2 3 4 
Variables Litigation (logit) Litigation (probit) Litigation amount (OLS) 
Size 
1.960*** 0.0087*** 7.025*** 
(0.376) (0.003) (0.09) 
Non-performing loans 
0.0933*** 25.050 8.88*** 
(0.036) (50.616) (1.82) 
ROLROE 
5.661 1.338 6.588 
(4.075) (10.74) (13.55) 
Capital 
0.00103 -11,721 34.21 
(0.003) (28.718) (29.76) 
Legal Fees ratio 
181.2*** 3.080 -4.538* 
(59.150) (3.133) (2.522) 
Employees ratio 
45.82 -2.287  
(503.30) (19.26)  
Trading Income ratio 
0.798 7.687***  
(1.185) (2.770)  
Investment Banking Income 
ratio 
4.108* 1.189e+07**  
(2.489) (0.522)  
Foreign Loans ratio 
 9.745e+07**  
 (3.916e+07)  
Opacity 
 4.222  
 (24.891)  
Compensation 
  -4.802 
  (2.397) 
Constant 
-5.037*** -2.811 -1.183 
(0.457) (8.630) (0.153) 
Observations 26,915 1,070 2,880 
Number of BHCs 1,373 34 96 
Fixed effect   Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared   0.601 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.306  0.209  
Note: This table presents results from probit, logit and fixed effect regressions of litigation on BHCs’ size, opacity and 
other variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the 
coefficients in parentheses. 
  
Table 4-9 - Litigation probit and logit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Variables Litigation (logit) Litigation (probit) Litigation (logit) Litigation (probit) 
Size 
4.680*** 1.960*** 0.503*** 4.030*** 
(0.940) (0.376) (0.077) (0.990) 
Non-performing loans 
0.194** 0.0933*** -0.0474 -0.0747 
(0.094) (0.031) (0.043) (0.123) 
Profitability 
10.84 5.661 -0.0152 24.56 
(8.993) (4.075) (4.061) (16.880) 
Capital 
0.00274 0.00103 0.00140 -0.0186 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.049) 
Legal Fees ratio 
437.6*** 181.2***  603.7 
(146.300) (59.150)  (384.7) 
Employees ratio 
76.60 45.82 438.1 -5.786* 
(1.382) (503.3) (453.6) (3,373) 
Fiduciary Income ratio 
  -2.433**  
  (1.159)  
Trading Income ratio 
0.318 0.798 1.013 -2.372 
(2.545) (1.185) (1.246) (3.650) 
Investment Banking 
Income ratio 
12.67** 4.108* -5.082** -14.47 
(6.153) (2.489) (2.554) (9.858) 
Opacity 
   0.00597 
   (0.024) 
Foreign Loans ratio 
  22.23** 325.2*** 
  (9.426) (61.320) 
Constant 
11.98*** -5.037*** -10.962*** -6.399*** 
(1.056) (0.457) (1.005) (1.669) 
Observations 26,915 26,915 26,586 7,490 
Number of BHCs 1,373 1,373 1,371 411 
Note: The table presents results from probit and logit regressions of litigation on BHCs’ size, opacity and other 
variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the 
coefficients in parentheses. 
  
Appendix 2 
Table 1a - BHCs used in systemic risk regressions 
1 2 
Ticker BHC Name 
BAC Bank Of America Corp 
BBT B B & T Corp 
BK Bank New York Inc 
C Citigroup Inc 
CBH Commerce Bancorp Inc Nj 
CMA Comerica Inc 
HBAN Huntington Bancshares Inc 
HCBK Hudson City Bancorp Inc 
JPM J P Morgan Chase & Co 
KEY Keycorp New 
MI Marshall & Ilsley Corp New 
MTB M & T Bank Corp 
NCC National City Corp 
NTRS Northern Trust Corp 
NYB New York Community Bancorp Inc 
PBCT Peoples United Financial Inc 
PNC P N C Financial Services Grp Inc 
RF Regions Financial Corp New 
SNV Synovus Financial Corp 
STI Suntrust Banks Inc 
UB Unionbancal Corp 
USB U S Bancorp Del 
WB Wachovia Corp 2nd New 
WFC Wells Fargo & Co New 
ZION Zions Bancorp 
AMP Ameriprise Financial Inc 
AXP American Express Co 
BEN Franklin Resources Inc 
CBSS Compass Bancshares Inc 
COF Capital One Financial Corp 
FITB Fifth Third Bancorp 
SEIC S E I Investments Company 
ETFC E Trade Financial Corp 
GS Goldman Sachs Group Inc 
MS Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co 
SCHW Schwab Charles Corp New 
TROW T Rowe Price Group Inc 
Table 2a - Frequency of BHCs involved in litigation 
1 2 3 4 
Legal name Freq. Legal name Freq. 
1ST Centennial Bancorp 2 Heartland Financial USA, Inc. 1 
Access National Corporation 6 Heritage Oaks Bancorp 2 
ACNB Corporation 2 High Country Financial Corporation 2 
Alliance Financial Services, Inc. 8 Hometown Community Bancorp, Inc. 3 
Amboy Bancorporation 7 HSBC North America Inc. 2 
Americorp 1 HSBC USA Inc. 2 
Amsouth Bancorporation 2 International Bancshares Corporation 5 
ANB Corporation, The 1 J.P. Morgan Chase & co. 2 
Associated Banc-Corp 5 JPMorgan Chase & co. 26 
Banctrust Financial Group, Inc. 2 K Capital Corporation 2 
Bank of America Corporation 14 Mackinac Financial Corporation 1 
Bank of Commerce Holdings 2 Mercantile Bancorp, Inc. 2 
Belmont Bancorp 6 Mid-America Bancorp 3 
Beverly Hills Bancorp Inc. 1 Mountain National Bancshares, Inc. 2 
BOH Holdings, Inc. 1 National Bancorp, Inc. 1 
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 1 National Bancshares, Inc. 3 
Bostonfed Bancorp, Inc. 1 National City Corporation 4 
Bremer Financial Corporation 2 National Commerce Financial Corporation 4 
Business Bancshares, Inc. 2 NB Holdings Corporation 2 
Capital Bank Financial Corp. 1 New Century Bancorp, Inc. 2 
Capital One Financial Corporation 3 Northeast Bancorp 3 
Centennial First Financial Services 3 Northern Trust Corporation 1 
Central Bancorp, Inc. 3 Old National Bancorp 1 
Central Bancshares, Inc. 1 Pacific City Financial Corporation 2 
Chinatrust Capital Corporation 8 Pacwest Bancorp 1 
CIB Marine Bancshares, Inc. 5 Pontotoc Bancshares Corp. 2 
Citicorp 3 Provident Financial Services, Inc. 1 
Citigroup Holdings Company 3 Pulaski Financial Corp. 4 
Citigroup Inc. 16 R&G Financial Corporation 4 
Citizens Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 1 Raymond James Financial, Inc. 3 
Comerica Incorporated 3 Regions Financial Corporation 4 
Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 1 Riggs National Corporation 2 
Commerce National Financial Services, Inc. 1 Saehan Bancorp 7 
Community Bancshares, Inc. 2 Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 2 
Community West Bancshares 3 Simmons First National Corporation 4 
Coppermark Bancshares, Inc. 4 Simplicity Bancorp, Inc. 1 
CU Bank Shares, Inc. 1 South Financial Group, Inc., The 4 
CVB Financial Corp. 1 Southern Illinois Bancorp, Inc. 1 
Discover Financial Services 8 Southern Michigan Bancorp, Inc. 1 
1 2 3 4 
Legal name Freq. Legal name Freq. 
Drew Bancshares, Inc. 1 State Financial Services Corporation 1 
Enterprise Financial Services Corp. 1 State Street Corporation 1 
Evergreenbancorp, Inc. 1 Sterling Financial Corporation 1 
Fidelity D&D Bancorp, Inc. 1 Stifel Financial Corp. 1 
Financial Investors of the South, Inc. 1 Summit Financial Group, Inc. 1 
First Bancorp 1 Synovus Financial Corp. 6 
First bancorp. of durango, Inc. 12 Taunus Corporation 1 
First Citizens Bancorp 3 Taylor Capital Group, Inc. 3 
First Commonwealth Financial Corporation 1 Tri City Bankshares Corporation 3 
First National Bancshares, Inc. 1 U.S. Bancorp 2 
First National Community Bancorp Inc. 1 U.S. Trust Corporation 1 
First National Of Nebraska, Inc. 1 UCBH Holdings, Inc. 2 
First Regional Bancorp 1 UMB Financial Corporation 1 
FNB United Corp. 1 Umpqua Holdings Corporation 5 
FSB Mutual Holdings, Inc. 3 Wachovia Corporation 2 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., The 4 Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. 4 
Grand Bankshares, Inc. 3 Webster Financial Corporation 3 
Great Southern Capital Corporation 1 West Coast Bancorp 1 
Harris Bankcorp, Inc. 3 Westamerica Bancorporation 3 
Harris Financial Corp. 2 Total 341 
  
Table 3a - BHCs significantly involved in litigation settlements during 2001‒2014 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Year 
Frequency of 
Litigation 
Average Litigation 
Settlement ($m) 
S.D. Median Min Max 
2001 17  64,685   28,700.00   54,686.00   5,111.00   150,000.00  
2002 32  72,231   14,338.00   79,876.00   19,898.00   89,779.00  
2003 17  4,960   2,320.00   6,765.00   200.00   7,059.00  
2004 41  919,539   97,877.00   988,997.00   62,999.00   999,978.00  
2005 13  666,190   130,988.00   666,890.00   34,002.00   878,999.00  
2006 6  5,654   970.00   4,674.00   1,389.00   6,787.00  
2007 16  23,542   16,876.00   20,548.00   1,002.00   57,657.00  
2008 51  8,751   2,100.00   8,788.00   1,201.00   9,876.00  
2009 8  30,563   5,600.00   32,569.00   14,560.00   34,565.00  
2010 32  883,612   502,320.00   912,022.00   345,983.00   998,787.00  
2011 33  1,058,921   60,898.00   1,098,921.00   9,800.00   220,001.00  
2012 42  1,073,620   67,677.00   1,073,550.00   1,789.00   250,505.00  
2013 33  2,181,125   89,009.00   2,198,600.00   1,890.00   300,911.00  
Source: Author’s calculations, based on statistical analysis of FR-9YC data. 
 
